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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis research is part of the ongoing research project called CyberCIEGE, 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. The purpose of CyberCIEGE is to develop a 
computer-based game to teach network security and Information Assurance concepts to 
military personnel and to students in introductory computer security courses.  
The question that this thesis answered was: is it possible to develop a 
CyberCIEGE Scenario Definition File (SDF) that can illustrate the principles of 
Multilevel Security (MLS) systems and how they can be deployed to protect different 
classes of sensitive information and their application in a military context?  
 
B. THESIS SCOPE AND LAYOUT 
The scope of this thesis research is to develop a scenario definition file for the 
CyberCIEGE game engine to illustrate and train DOD personnel and students in the 
introductory computer security courses on matters related to information protection using 
Multilevel Security (MLS) systems. Research was focused on the protection of sensitive 
information in a Command and Control (C2) center, primarily on the protection of 
different classes of information in storage and transmission. This information forms part 
of the virtual characters’ assets, e.g. command information, structure information, 
databases etc. Failure to protect such information might result in the compromise of state 
secrets and the failure to accomplish military missions.  
A test plan was developed to test whether the scenario behaves as might be 
expected in a real-world scenario. The impact of this research could benefit future DOD 
training and education requirements in the Information Assurance or Computer System 
Security areas, as well as educational benefits in the civilian sector. 
This thesis is comprised of the following chapters:  
• Chapter I – Introduction. This chapter provides the thesis statement and 
defines the scope for this thesis. It gives an overview of the chapters and 
annexes to this work. 
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• Chapter II – Background. This chapter describes the CyberCIEGE project, 
provides the background to the issues for this thesis and illustrates the 
contribution of this thesis to the overall CyberCIEGE project. It describes 
the need for the management of classified information, what a multilevel 
system is, the need for high assurance, and how high assurance multilevel 
components can be used to provide controlled sharing of classified 
information.  
• Chapter III – Scenario Goals. This chapter spells out the three educational 
goals that are to be achieved through the design of this scenario. It also 
identifies the intended players who will benefit from playing this scenario.  
• Chapter IV- Scenario Description. This chapter describes the simulated 
gaming environment modeled by the SDF. It includes the scenario’s 
narrative, briefing to the player, a description of the users in the game and 
the assets that the players must protect. 
• Chapter V – Testing. This chapter describes the test strategy and test cases 
that were designed to verify the scenario. It includes the scope, expected 
and actual results of the testing conducted.   
• Chapter VI – Conclusion. This chapter summarizes the work 







This chapter provides a description of CyberCIEGE and issues concerning the 
management of a multilevel secure system. Readers are encouraged to read [IRVINE 
2003] and [SMITH 2005] for more in-depth discussions of these topics.  
 
A. GAMING, THE NEXT GENERATION OF TRAINING IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 
In our phase of the information age, the computer has literally penetrated all 
forms of deployment from number crunching office processing to real-time air traffic 
control systems, as well as mission-critical military applications (such as Command and 
Control systems).  The fast processing and accurate computing capabilities of the 
computer have rendered numerous functional and economical advantages. Today the 
computer has become one of the indispensable and common assets that any organization 
needs.  
According to [PRENSKY 2003], the proliferation of personal computers and the 
introduction of digital games have changed the way we learn and interact with computers. 
Computer games have become the alternative tool for cost effective training of a game  
savvy generation of soldiers; soldiers learn by playing the different scenarios of the game, 
and pitting the skills they acquire in the classroom lectures against the computer game 
engine in order to complete and win. Many institutions all around the world are using 
gaming tools to educate and motivate their students to learn and acquire new skills. As 
cited in [Fong 4004] and [Zyda 2003], military organizations are also beginning to deploy 
and make use of COTS gaming for their ongoing training and military experiments.  The 
advantages of leveraging computers are multi-fold. First, it is low risk as it does not 
involve deploying actual equipment like weapons or exposing systems to adversarial 
attacks. Without such deployment, the gaming is also more economical. Second, it taps  
the experience of senior officers to create scenarios which depict real occurrences in 
relatively short development time. Last, incorporation of computer gaming into training 
curriculum saves training resources and increases realism through the conduct of  
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distributed gaming involving multiple parties. With these advantages, gaming is rapidly 
becoming an integral part of the educational toolset. 
 
B. CYBERCIEGE 
One objective of the Center for Information Systems Studies and Research 
(CISR) at the Naval Postgraduate School is to provide improved information assurance 
education and training for the U.S. military and government. The CyberCIEGE program 
was initiated by CISR as one strategy to achieve this objective: to develop a gaming tool 
to convey knowledge about Information Assurance (IA) and at the same time teach users 
to apply this knowledge and skill in a variety of situations [IRVINE 2003]. The goal of 
CyberCIEGE is to provide a simulated virtual deployment environment where players 
internalize concepts by playing CyberCIEGE. Through CyberCiege, players learn and 
understand how computer architectures and infrastructures can be compromised or 
protected. In doing so, it is hoped that CyberCIEGE will impart knowledge about the 
general concepts of computer and network security, and the measures that could be taken 
to improve the protection of sensitive and critical information.  
CyberCIEGE is a security simulation game that simulates a range of scenarios to 
engage the users in applying their computer and network security concepts to complete 
these games. Each scenario depicts an organization with some pre-defined users and 
assets. The users work and earn money for the organization. In order to be productive, 
these users have to access assets as part of achieving their goals. Assets are information 
that is valuable to the organization for example: weapon specifications, military 
operations strategies, and organizational development plans. As such, these assets are 
also of interest to the competitors and adversaries who may use this knowledge against 
the organization.  Competitors will resort to all means to capture these assets.  
The objective of each scenario will be for the players to make money for the 
organization by keeping the users happy, allowing them to achieve their goals by 
accessing assets, and avoiding penalties when the security policy is violated, which will 
compromise the assets. Players of CyberCIEGE have to provide the necessary resources 
and environment needed by the users to reach their goals. The players will purchase and 
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set up computers and network equipment to facilitate the users’ access to their assets. By 
connecting the computer systems, these assets become available via the network which 
the users can access. However, there is risk involved when connecting the assets to the 
network; competitors and adversaries will exploit these network connections to capture 
the assets. Therefore, a tension exists between risk mitigation against security policy 
violation and the requirement to allow users to accomplish their tasks.   
The player assumes the role of the defender of some important assets in each 
scenario; his tasks will include setting up and configuring the computer and network 
infrastructures to achieve the designated operational goals. He will make security-
relevant decisions about the systems to deploy, the network components and their 
interconnections. The simulator, on the other hand, will respond by generating attackers 
who may exploit any vulnerabilities or gaps in the infrastructure to compromise the 
valuable assets and undermine the security of the network. The simulator can assume 
many adversarial roles, such as incompetent users, vandals, and professional attackers, to 
simulate various types of attacks. To ensure security, the player must install sufficient 
security measures to allow the virtual characters in the games to achieve their operational 
goals without compromising the security.  
Ultimately, CISR envisages that CyberCIEGE will become an integral part of the 
educational tools for all information assurance training in the U.S. military and 
government. The advantages of using CyberCIEGE are as follows: first, it exposes 
players to various practical scenarios so that they can learn by virtual implementation of 
the required computer infrastructure. The experiences gained through going through these 
scenarios will be valuable to the players as they can apply what they have learned to their 
actual ground deployment. The scenarios are configurable to depict actual deployments, 
and players can run them repeatedly to try out various alternative implementations to 
evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. Hence it is much cheaper and less risky to run 
computer simulations than to provide actual test beds for gaining such experiences. 
Eventually CyberCIEGE will complement conventional classroom and seminar-style 
teaching to provide a more interactive and engaging learning environment. 
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C.  MANAGEMENT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION  
Government departments and private organizations need to protect their sensitive 
information. For a business organization, sensitive information includes operational 
processes which provide the company’s competitive advantage and hence its 
survivability, or trade secrets from which the company gains its profit. For a government 
to ensure the nation’s survival, it must religiously control sensitive information that may 
give the nation a significant advantage over its adversaries and prevent enemies from 
gaining advantages that could potentially damage the nation.  Such information is 
jealously protected and not shared with unauthorized persons. 
The defense community, in particular, because of the nature of its work to protect 
the nation’s sovereignty, will always protect national secrets and sensitive information. 
Such information includes the country’s military operations, intelligence information 
gathered about adversaries, discussion about diplomatic activities and issues concerning 
national security and national affairs. The military also possesses information and 
technologies which could be helpful to the enemy, and if such information is released 
without authorization, it will compromise the nation’s security. Such compromise can 
result in battles lost, operations compromised, and death and injury to military personnel. 
There is a need to protect and control this information. 
The military protects information through the use of a classification system. 
Sensitive information is partitioned into a set of equivalence classes which have 
associated labels. Access is based upon label comparison. This provides protection and 
controlled access to the information. Sensitive information is normally classified based 
on the severity and impact of its compromise. In the U.S, there are three levels of 
classification: TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL, in decreasing order of 
sensitivity. TOP SECRET information is information that if leaked will cause 
exceptionally grave damage to the nation’s security. This includes weapon designs, 
intelligence and national security information. SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL 
information must also be protected, but the impact of its disclosure is less severe. 
SECRET information applies to that information that could cause serious damage to 
national security when disclosed without authorization. A CONFIDENTIAL  
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classification is applied to information when disclosed without authorization will cause 
damage to the national security. Information that is not in these sensitivity levels is 
unclassified. 
To access classified information, personnel must have appropriate security 
clearance and have a need to know  the information. Security clearance statuses are 
assigned for some members of the military community, government departments and 
contractors to allow them to have access to the classified information. Such clearances 
are granted through a formal investigation process to assess the member’s credentials and 
character. These processes involve background checks, credit history reviews and 
agency-specific examinations [FBI 2005]. Depending upon the type of classified 
information involved, the required security clearance will vary and all clearance status 
will be renewed periodically. When granted the appropriate security clearance, members 
can only access classified information on a “need to know” basis. 
Classified information is critical to decision making because it provides insights 
into a situation as well as undisclosed facts that are instrumental to issues to be discussed 
and detailed information about the domain. Classified information is assimilated and 
analyzed into reports to enhance the decision makers’ judgments on the issues and thus 
increase the effectiveness of decision making. However, decisions are usually not made 
based on information from one classification alone. Critical decisions like decisions to 
launch military operations, merge companies, or decisions to develop or purchase certain 
weapon systems, are carefully deliberated. Informed decisions are only made when 
information from various sources is consolidated to provide an overall picture which is 
then appraised and decided on. Government departments and agencies should not operate 
as a loosely coupled environment, but as a closely collaborative and integrated unit. 
Decisions are made over evolving negotiation and decision-making processes.  Similarly, 
in the military, missions and operations are carried out as an integrated force with the 
support from all services and operational units. The Navy, Marine and Air Force 
combined their efforts as joint operations in Operation Enduring Freedom 
[GlobalSecurity 2005], and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As the world becomes more 
connected, battles and wars against threats to peace, for example, the war against 
terrorism, will not be fought by an individual nation, but as a joint effort among the 
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countries to maintain peace and order across the globe. Therefore, there is a need for 
information from different sources with different sensitivity levels to be merged for 
processing and integration. Officers will need to access information across multiple 
sensitivity levels in order to achieve their objectives and carry out their jobs. There is a 
need for a more efficient, interoperable and secure infrastructure to share this 
information. 
 
D.  INFORMATION SECURITY  
The secure management of classified information has always been a challenge to 
the computer security community. For any management of classified information, 
security policies are needed to define the rules to govern the protection of the sensitive 
information against potential threats. Based on the security polices and the types of 
computer components used, different operating environments will be set up. In a 
dedicated mode of operation where protection is provided by physical means external to 
the computers, the computers are not equipped with stringent security mechanisms. 
Examples of such physical means are fences, guards, motion alarm systems, biometric 
zone access, and so forth. In this mode of operation, all users have clearance and a need 
to access the highest classified information in the computer systems, and the computer 
systems are not connected to a network beyond the physical perimeter of the secure zone. 
Everything within the physical perimeter is considered to be secured. In such situations, 
security policy is enforced at the physical boundary and not at the computer systems. 
In a single level security system environment, the computers are equipped with 
internal security mechanisms to protect the sensitive information and control the users’ 
access to this information. Not all users are granted access or have the need to access all 
the information. Based on the users’ logins to the systems, the access control mechanism 
in the computer systems will regulate the information that they can access. Single level 
security systems protect information of the same security classification; information of 
different classifications is stored in separate single level security systems. Internal 
security mechanisms are built into the single level security systems to enforce the access 
control policy.  
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As the advancement of technology is exploited to further manage different 
classifications of information, verified and trusted mechanisms must be put in place 
within these computer systems to distinguish different levels of information and different 
levels of user authorizations and access.  This gives rise to the multilevel systems, which 
compartmentalize information of different classifications, and protect and control access 
to the classified information. These multilevel security systems have internal mechanisms 
to enforce the security policy and provide some level of assurance that their 
functionalities and mechanisms do so robustly and reliably. Secure information 
infrastructures are also needed to protect information of different classifications from 
users with different security clearances. 
In addition to these operational requirements, basic information security pervades 
all such needs.  The basic information security objectives are confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. To ensure confidentiality, information must be disclosed to authorized 
persons only. Integrity of information is important to ensure that information is not 
unintentionally and maliciously modified in storage or in transmission. Equally important 
is the need for information to be available at all times regardless of attacks or breakdown 
of services.  Three key mechanisms are important to achieve confidentiality, integrity and 
availability: a) authentication to establish the identity of the entity using the system, b) 
access control to restrict the access of information to only legitimated users, and c) audit 
trails to records all activities related to this information. 
 
1. Secure Systems 
According to [DOD 5200.28], the features of a secure computer system are as 
follows:  
Secure systems will control, through use of specific security features, 
access to information such that only properly authorized individuals, or 
processes operating on their behalf, will have access to read, write, create, 
or delete information. 
To implement such a system, the following fundamental requirements must be 
met. First, there must be a security policy that defines a set of rules from the management 
governing the usage of computer systems for information processing. It determines 
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whether a given subject can be permitted to access a particular object. The security 
policy’s objective is to serve as: 
A statement of intent with regard to control over access to and 
dissemination of information, to be known as the security policy must be 
precisely defined and implemented for each system that is used to process 
sensitive information. The security policy must accurately reflect the laws, 
regulations, and general policies from which it is derived [DOD 5200.28]. 
Using the security policy, rules are implemented in computer systems to enforce 
the policy. These rules will mandate the life cycle management of classified information, 
and the access control of this information. Based on the subject’s clearance and 
authorization to the information, and the classification of the information, these rules will 
determine the mode of access the subject has to the information. These rules, known as 
mandatory security controls, are non-discretionary and will apply to all information 
stored in the computer system and entities that access that information. Mandatory 
security controls should correctly reflect the security policy.  For more granular control of 
information within mandatory security control, discretionary security controls are 
introduced. Discretionary controls provide users with the ability to control and limit 
access of information based on the individual’s discretionary need-to-know requirement 
for that information. 
All objects in the computer system must be classified according to their sensitivity 
levels. Active entities in the system, subjects, will have modes of access to the objects, 
that is, read only, write only or a combination of these access modes. The secure system 
must maintain the integrity of this security classification and the information so that 
mandatory access controls can accurately mediate access. Similarly, all subjects that 
access the objects in the system must be identified, and the subject’s access must be 
mediated by the access control mechanisms. Identification of the subjects is done through 
the authentication mechanisms which represent to the system the subject’s clearances and 
need to know for information. Based on a subject’s clearance and need to know, 
mandatory and discretionary controls are invoked. All activities carried out by the 
subjects must be reliably maintained in the system.  
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The computer system must provide an audit trail to trace actions that affect the 
security of the system. It must reliably record security-related activities in an audit log 
and protect them from unauthorized amendment and destruction. These audit records may 
be used for subsequent investigations into system violations, if necessary.  
The system must provide mechanisms that enforce the above requirements.  The 
designs of these mechanisms must comply with some mathematical formal methods and 
they must be properly implemented using rigorous controls and proven standards. The 
system must ensure that these enforcing mechanisms are themselves being protected 
against any forms of unauthorized modifications and compromise. In addition, these 
mechanisms should be evaluated to provide assurance that the system enforces the 
security policy. 
 
2. Reference Monitor Concept 
To describe the enforcement mechanism for authorized access control between 
the subjects and objects, the reference monitor concept was introduced by James P. 
Anderson in the 1972 Computer Security Technology Planning Study [Anderson 1972].  
The function of the reference monitor is to validate all references (to 
programs, data, peripherals, etc.) made by programs in execution against 
those authorized for the subject (user, etc.). The reference monitor not 
only is responsible to assure that the reference are authorized to shared 
resource objects, but also to assure that the reference is the right kind (i.e., 
read, or read and write, and etc.). [Anderson 1972]  
The reference monitor enforces the authorized access relationship between 
subjects and objects of a system, and this forms the basis for development of systems that 
provide secure sharing of resources. The implementation of the reference monitor is 
known as the reference validation mechanism (RVM). It is the hardware and software 
that implements the reference monitor concept. RVM mediates all references to objects 
based on the subject’s access rights stored in the system’s access control database. The 
reference monitor concept and its implementation, that is, RVM, are essential notions of 
high assurance systems that provide multilevel secure computing facilities and controls. 
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3. Multilevel Secure System 
The interdependence of multilevel classified information and security clearances 
of users introduces the concept of multilevel security and multilevel security (MLS) 
systems [Smith 2005]. In the early deployments of systems that process classified 
information, separate single level computers and networks were used to handle 
information of different security classifications. This prevents uncontrolled sharing of 
information across different classifications and prevents leakage of higher classified 
information to those of lower classification. However such deployments had 
disadvantages: there was a lot more equipment to manage, different networks to maintain, 
and users had to physically switch between systems to access information of different 
classifications. Thus, such solutions were costly, difficult to maintain and troublesome to 
use. The defense industry began to research ways in which dedicated high systems could 
be used to access different classifications of information while reducing the cost in 
deploying multiple systems and networks.  Periods processing was introduced. Periods 
processing established protocols, by which users can connect their computers to networks 
at one classification, process the information, sanitize the systems and reconnect them to 
other networks of different classifications. This allowed the same set of systems to be 
used to access information with different classifications. However, periods processing did 
not address the need to access information from multiple networks simultaneously and 
offered little improvement to the separate systems and networks solution.  
The concept of a MLS system is a system that can process information of 
different security levels, label and isolate information at the appropriate levels and share 
the information only to the appropriate cleared users. In order to achieve such secure 
sharing of classified information, MLS systems require a set of security mechanisms to 
ensure that access to this classified information is strictly controlled according to some 
predefined security policies. These security mechanisms must be reliable, robust, and 
built with assurance such that they are invoked consistently and cannot be compromised 
or subverted. Independent third-party testing and evaluation is conducted to review and 
analyze the implementation to provide an unbiased assurance assessment that the system 
does enforce the defined policies diligently.   
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In an MLS system, all entities have security-relevant attributes or labels 
associated with them. Subjects are active entities that cause information to flow among 
objects. In computer systems, subjects are processes and applications that run on behalf 
of the users. Based on the users’ access rights and log in sessions, subjects inherit a 
subset of the users’ authorized permissions to access certain objects, the modes of access 
and the security levels of the login session. Objects, on the other hand, are passive entities 
that store information. Objects have access control lists and security class labels, which 
together signify the security classification and access rights to the information that the 
objects hold. The interaction among these entities often follows the following principles: 
• Subjects may share information among themselves if they are of the same 
sensitivity level.  
• Lower sensitivity level subjects can write information to higher security 
level objects, but they cannot read information from the higher security 
objects.  
• Higher sensitivity level subjects can read information from the lower 
security objects but they cannot write information to lower security level 
objects. 
These principles enforce the “write down and read up” security restrictions. They 
allow a user with the security access level of SECRET to retrieve information from the 
lower security levels, like CONFIDENTIAL, and write up to TOP SECRET information.  
However, these restrictions will disallow this user to read TOP SECRET information or 
write CONFIDENTIAL information, in the absence of a trusted mechanism [DOD 
5200.28]. Hence, the MLS system must be equipped with an internal mechanism to 
enforce the security policy.  
 
4. Bell-LaPadula Security Model  
In 1974, the Bell-LaPadula security model was introduced. The Bell-LaPadula 
security model defines a set of restrictions that is essential to providing secure protection 
of classified information in a multilevel security system [LaPadula 1996]. It enforces 
MLS access control with the following subset of rules: 
a. Simple Security Property (Confidentiality) 
A subject can read from an object as long as the subject’s sensitivity level 
is the same as or higher than the object’s sensitivity level. This property implements the 
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no read up requirement; that is it prevents subjects from reading information the 
sensitivity level of which exceeds the subject’s sensitivity level. 
b. *- Property (Confidentiality) 
A subject can write to an object as long as the subject’s sensitivity  level is 
the same or lower than the object’s sensitivity level. This property implements the no 
write down requirement; that is, subjects with a higher sensitivity level cannot pass 
information to users or objects of a lower sensitivity level. 
The Bell-LaPadula security model is consistent with the MAC secrecy 
policy for the enforcement of controlled access to classified information. It effectively 
ensures and protects the confidentiality of the information and prevents the flow of 
information via “read up” and “write down”, as required by an MLS system.  As a result, 
most MLS systems and components implement security mechanisms that enforce the 
Bell-LaPadula security model. 
c. Limitations of Bell-LaPadula Security Model    
There are some inherent operational limitations to the Bell-LaPadula 
model. First, the policy imposed by the MLS access control can hinder operational and 
security needs. In the design of a Command and Control system, TOP SECRET 
information is used to determine the course of actions and is then translated into tactical 
commands for ground troops to execute. Such tactical commands are passed downward 
in digital form via encrypted voice communication links which have only SECRET 
security classification. Therefore, there is an operational need to downgrade TOP 
SECRET information into SECRET information so that it can be transmitted via the 
SECRET channel to the ground troops on the field. Such downgrading of information has 
to be done through trusted subjects, or manual sanitization and reclassification by officers 
before this information is disseminated through the appropriate channels [DOD5200.28]. 
Second, developers of MLS systems discovered that it is extremely 
difficult to completely prevent information flow across different security levels. All 
computer operating systems share resources, like memory and CPU timing, among 
processes to optimize performance. In sharing these resources, the operating systems may 
open channels for processes to exchange information. Thus it is difficult to prevent covert  
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channels [Cohen 1990]. Building a system to ensure that the Bell-LaPadula model’s flow 
of information is enforced at all times requires considerable sophisticated security 
engineering. 
Last, the Bell-LaPadula model allows information to flow from low to a 
high security level; this is consistent with the security policy governing the secrecy of 
classified information. However, the Bell-LaPadula model does not address the integrity 
of classified information, that is, it does not prevent some low integrity information or 
low secrecy classification from writing up to information of a higher classification. This 
can compromise the integrity of the more highly classified information. For example, if 
malicious applications are introduced, they can flow to the high security entities, and 
corrupt and amend the highly classified information without authorization. To some 
degree, malicious applications like viruses can replicate themselves in the systems they 
infect. If a virus is implanted at the unclassified level of an MLS system implementing 
the Bell-LaPadula model, the virus can potentially spread to the higher sensitivity levels 
of the MLS system. Integrity of classified information is addressed by different polices 
with a different set of security rules and models, for example, the Biba integrity model. 
 
5. Biba Integrity Model 
Another model that is of relevance to the protection of classified information in a 
MLS system is the Biba security model. While Bell-LaPadula model protects against the 
flow of sensitive information to less sensitive components in the MLS system, the Biba 
model protects high integrity information from being modified by low integrity subjects. 
Enforcement of the Biba security model has the following implications: 
1.  A subject S can read an object O if and only if the integrity level of S is 
less than or equal to the integrity level of O. This ensures that a subject of 
a higher integrity classification cannot read data from an object of lower 
integrity classification 
2.  A subject S can write to object O if and only if the integrity level of O is 
less than or equal to the integrity level of S. In this case, a subject with 




3.  A subject S1 can invoke another subject S2 if and only if the integrity 
level of S2 is less than or equal to S1. This keeps a low integrity subject 
from invoking a high integrity subject, which could then modify 
information on its behalf 
The Biba integrity model complements the Bell-LaPadula security model in that it 
preserves the integrity of information in the system that implements the model and  
prevents data modification from unauthorized parties or from less reliable sources of 
lower integrity.  
Both the Bell-LaPadula and Biba security models describe properties and rules 
that control access to classified information. Theoretically, systems which implement 
internal mechanisms to strictly adhere to these models protect against the leakage of high 
value, sensitive information. These models have shown to be consistent with rules 
defined in most organization’s security policies for the management of classified 
information.  
A lot of research and implementations have been conducted to develop MLS 
systems. However, due to the high complexity of such implementations and the high cost 
associated with these products, there is a limited number of MLS systems available in the 
commercial products.  
So, despite all the effort to develop MLS systems and models, most organizations 
are still using separate networks and systems to process classified and sensitive 
information. Military services use MLS systems only for specialized operations where 
specific sharing of information with different classifications is required. In most military 
departments, classified information is still managed in separate systems and networks. To 
permit the use of computer systems to process and store classified information securely, 
systems of higher assurance are required. The following section discusses the concept of 
system assurance.  
 
6. Assurance  
When computer systems are implemented to enforce  organizational security 
polices and rules, it is essential that the internal mechanisms of the computer systems are 
correctly implemented and that they strictly enforce these rules. How are computer 
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systems assured that they actually provide the claimed security functionalities and that 
these functionalities are effective and implemented correctly? Assurance of the computer 
system is the confidence that the claimed measures, in this case security measures, are 
implemented correctly and that they enforce the rules according to some security policies. 
To achieve a certain level of assurance in the system, computer systems have to undergo 
some IT security evaluation, certification and accreditation conducted by independent 
evaluators or authorities. These independent evaluators and authorities will evaluate the 
systems based on a set of well-defined assurance criteria, which are derived from the 
users’ organizational security objectives and security policies.  
The most common security evaluation of information technology systems and 
products is the Common Criteria (CC) [CC 2005]. CC is an international standard for 
evaluating computer security. It defines a set of potential security requirements in terms 
of functional and assurance requirements. IT products and systems are evaluated based 
on these security requirements to provide assurance that the products do in fact meet the 
claimed security functionalities. The assurance validation of the security measures are 
benchmarked against seven Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs), numbered from 1 to 7, 
with the higher EALs requiring more vigorous testing and formal evaluation to 
extensively validate the security mechanism to ensure that it is correctly developed and 
effective in countering the identified threats. 
At the lowest assurance level, that is EAL1, functional testing is conducted to 
ascertain that security features of the component comply with the functional and interface 
specifications of the system. An EAL1 assurance component functions in a manner 
consistent with its documentation and it provides useful protection against identified 
threats. As the product is evaluated for higher assurance, more methodical testing and 
formal evaluation will be conducted.  For higher assurance systems, that is, systems 
evaluated at EAL 5, 6 and 7, the designers of these systems have to provide a chain of 
evidence demonstrating that the design of the systems is based upon a provable formal 
mathematical model. For an EAL7 evaluation, the formal models are supplemented with 
formal functional specifications and a correspondence between the two formal 
representations is proved. Informal mapping is used to demonstrate a correspondence 
between various lower levels of system design specification and the formal 
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representation. Eventually, evidence must be produced to show that the implementation 
of the different layers in systems and the interfaces between these layers map to the 
formal specifications. To satisfy EAL7, the complexity of the system design will also 
have to be minimized. EAL7 assurance is applicable to components developed for use in 
extremely high risk situations or where the high value of the assets they contain justifies 
the requirement for such evaluation. Higher assurance systems are evaluated based on 
EAL5, EAL6 and EAL7 criteria. 
 
E.  SUMMARY 
Information can be protected without MLS. MLS makes it less costly because 
there is less equipment and it requires fewer people to manage. It also makes it easier to 
access real-time lower-level information. But it comes with more risk, and therefore there 
needs to be higher assurance systems. MLS systems are very useful to secure and manage 
highly valuable classified information. They provide a mechanism for controlled sharing 
of classified resources and information. As we transform into the digital era, more and 
more of our functions and assets will be migrated into the digital platforms. Future battles 
might be fought over the cyber domain; therefore, it is important that we have the 
necessary and reliable mechanisms to protect these digital assets. 
The next chapter will present the research questions of this thesis and at the same 




III. SCENARIO GOALS 
A. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following research question: Can a 
scenario be developed to illustrate the principles of Multilevel Secure (MLS) systems? 
An ancillary question is: how can MLS systems be deployed to protect different classes 
of sensitive information in the military environment? This scenario should address the 
issues concerning simultaneous access to information with different sensitivity levels.  
The player will be introduced to the management of different classifications of 
information. He will have the ability to make security-related decisions regarding how to 
enforce security and policies, in order to control access to sensitive information in a 
military-like networked environment. This thesis focuses on the tensions and trade-offs 
between the use of air-gapped single level systems and the interconnection of such 
systems using multilevel secure components.  
For the rest of this thesis, players will be referred to as officers and students who 
are using the CyberCIEGE system to learn IA concepts. Users will be the virtual 
characters that are part of the scenario in the CyberCIEGE game.  
 
B. SCENARIO EDUCATIONAL GOALS 
As explained in Chapter II, there is currently no available tool to validate IA 
concepts learned and acquired from lessons and textbooks, except to carry out actual 
implementations of such networks. The development of the scenario in this thesis is to 
provide a more realistic and effective alternative to the lecture-style training in IA. This 
scenario will use the CyberCIEGE game as the tool to introduce and train personnel in 
the issues highlighted in the research question posed above. The following sections will 
describe the intended players of this scenario, the educational goals derived from this 





1.  Intended Players 
The intended players for the CyberCIEGE game are government and DOD 
employees, both civilian and military personnel. The U.S. government places a lot of 
emphasis on IA training, especially with the endorsement of the E-Government Act of 
2002 [H.R. 2458]. The E-Government Act of 2002 specifically requires all government 
agencies to have agency programs to provide, among other training topics, security 
awareness training. The purpose is to educate all personnel, who support the operations 
and manage assets for the agency, regarding the information security risks associated 
with their duties, and their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and 
procedures designed to reduce these risks.  DOD, as a frontrunner in the development and 
deployment of information technology, also has clearly spelled out directives to promote 
the training of IT personnel to raise their IA awareness [DOD 85701]. DOD Directive 
8570.1 states that all DOD Information System personnel must have their initial IA 
awareness training before accessing DOD information systems. This training will be 
refreshed annually to ensure continual awareness and compliance to the IA policy. All 
these programs provide government employees and military officers with the basic 
knowledge of IA. To constantly provide IA training and to raise the awareness of 
information security, DOD and the Defense Information System Agency (DISA) have 
sponsored a web portal, “Information Assurance Support Environment - The DOD IA 
Portal”, to publish information about security issues and to help personnel keep abreast of 
the latest developments in this area.    
CyberCIEGE complements these efforts by providing a platform for players to 
apply and validate the IA concepts acquired in the agency programs. As a computer 
game, CyberCIEGE allows players to implement their concepts, experiment with 
different configurations and evaluate the effects. In doing so, players learn and appreciate 
the principles behind the decisions they have made while playing the game. Through 
role-playing the different scenarios, players can better relate to the IA issues and the 
configuration of the IT equipment set up in their office environments.  
As different players will have different levels of IA knowledge and training 
experience, the CyerCEIGE game can be designed with different scenarios to address 
different aspects and levels of IA training. In particular, the scenario developed for this 
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thesis focuses on the controlled access to and management of classified information of 
different sensitivity levels and the use of the MLS components to secure such access. 
Therefore, there are two groups of officers who will personally experience similar 
scenarios in their tour of duties: the first group will be authorized officers who have some 
basic understanding of IA and have regular access to classified information, and the 
second group is the IT developers who implement secure networks and MLS systems. 
The scenario is not restricted to these two groups of people; officers who are interested in 
knowing more about integrating secure networks and understanding MLS systems may 
also benefit from executing this scenario. 
a. Privileged Officers  
The targeted players for this scenario are authorized officers who have 
access to sensitive information, that is, information classified, for example, as 
Confidential, Secret or Top Secret. By virtue of the sensitivity of this information, these 
officers will have to manage their access to such information and ensure that they comply 
with the security policies. The scenario for this thesis will introduce the requirements for 
access to information of different classifications.  
Players of the scenario will have to make decisions and implement a 
secure infrastructure to protect these accesses. Through this scenario, players will be able 
to apply the concept of trusted systems and devise different strategies to apply to the 
game. In the process they will understand correct implementations for securing systems. 
b. Developers of Secure Networks  
Developers of secure networks plan and design the computer and network 
infrastructure. They understand the mechanisms of each of the components, their 
purposes, and how they can be installed in the network to provide the necessary services. 
Networking equipment is installed to connect computer systems to form local 
connections or to connect to other networks to form larger networks. Security equipment 
such as firewalls, filtering routers, and IDS are put in place at strategic network points to 
monitor and protect segments of the network. MLS systems are used to manage 
information of different classifications. Networks and information flowing into the MLS 
systems must be controlled and properly labeled with the correct security classification. 
All of these, and many other information security mechanisms, have to be put in place in 
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order to enforce the overall security policy and provide assurance that the valuable 
information assets are as securely stored and managed in the IT setup as they are required 
to be as stated in the organizational security policies. Developers can execute the various 
scenarios to understand how these mechanisms work and how they can be deployed to 
secure the IT infrastructure for MLS systems. This scenario will provide the developers 
with a better understanding of security implementation and improve the developer’s 
ability to make coherent design decisions to enforce information security.  
c. Others 
Besides the above two groups of people, other government employees and 
officers can also benefit from playing the CyberCIEGE game. Different CyberCIEGE 
scenarios will reinforce different information security concepts that are taught in the IA 
awareness courses. Players of the game will be refreshed with the IA concepts they have 
learned and they will be able to relate them to the real world applications in their offices. 
Lastly, CyberCIEGE raises these players’ awareness of the security policies and the roles 
they play to enforce them. 
 
2. Educational Goals 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a Scenario Definition File (SDF) that 
implements a scenario that is both educational and entertaining. The primary purpose of 
this SDF is to illustrate specific IA concepts concerning the management of classified 
information and to introduce the IT equipment and mechanisms that would provide a 
secure enough environment for classified information to be protected and accessed by 
authorized personnel. The scenario developed for this thesis is designed in a modular and 
sequential approach, such that the players will learn more in-depth concepts as they 
proceed further into the game. Issues concerning the protection and control of classified 
information will be gradually introduced to the players as they complete each phase and 
continue into the next higher level. New operational requirements will be introduced 
incrementally and the players are expected to fulfill all of these requirements in order to 
successfully complete the game. It is expected that players will fail to complete the game 
at their initial attempts. As players rerun the game, they will gain more experience from 
the mistakes they have previously committed and from the explanations provided by the 
in-built CyberCIEGE encyclopedia. These experiences and explanations will enlighten 
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the players and reinforce the IA concepts for them. Having understood the essence of 
these concepts, players will be able to apply them in the game and eventually complete 
the scenario.  
This scenario is designed with three educational goals, as described in the later 
part of this section: physical security is an integral part of information security, separate 
networks as an approach to manage information of different classifications, and 
controlled sharing of classified information. The intention is to convey these IA concepts 
to the players as they execute this game. Players will learn these concepts and appreciate 
how the computer and network infrastructure can be made secure to provide the 
necessary control and assurance to the IT system. 
To illustrate assets of different values, this scenario defines and uses the following 
secrecy classifications:  
TRULY SENSITIVE: The highest classification in the scenario. It is used on 
assets that the compromise of which will have devastating impact on all military 
operations and missions planned.  
SENSITIVE: This classification is used on assets that the compromise of which 
will have grave impact on all military activities. 
UNCLASSIFIED: This is the lowest classification in the Command and Control 
(C2) scenario. Assets of this classification have no secrecy value. 
The detailed descriptions of these labels are defined in Chapter IV. All assets in 
the C2 scenario will be assigned to one of these classifications to create values for the 
assets which the player must protect.  
In the design of this scenario, there are three classes of networks: a TRULY 
SENSITIVE network to access critical military intelligence information, a SENSITIVE 
network to access classified information disseminated by the Allied Forces, and the 
UNCLASSIFIED network where access to the Internet is provided. To focus the game on 
the controlled management of classified assets, the scenario has some defaults settings: 
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• The whole C2 center is designed as one zone and entry is only granted to 
users having TRULY SENSITIVE security clearances. 
• All users in the scenario are already cleared up to TRULY SENSITIVE so 
that players do not have to conduct background checks for all the users in 
the command center.  
• In real world implementations, DAC policies are implemented within a 
single level network. However this thesis will not address the enforcement 
of discretionary policies.  
 
a. Physical Security Is an Integral Part of Information Security  
Different levels of physical security should be implemented to protect 
assets of varying value. The higher the value of these assets, the stronger should the 
physical security be. The value of the organization’s assets and its motive to be attacked 
by adversaries, known as motive to attack, will determine the level of physical security to 
be put in place to protect these assets. The scenario developed for this research is used to 
illustrate these points.   
In CyberCIEGE, assets have value to the organization. They can be 
information needed for daily operations, or important information like military 
intelligence, tactical strategies or business plans, which are critical to the organization’s 
success. CyberCIEGE assets also are a motivating factor for adversaries to compromise 
them. Adversaries will engage in attacks from all possible venues to try to gain access 
and capture these assets.  In this scenario, TRULY SENSITIVE assets are given a very 
high motive value for attackers. In order to protect these assets, strong physical security 
must be enforced. Otherwise, the game’s attack engine will compromise the TRULY 
SENSITIVE asset. And by selecting very strong physical security, e.g. guards, the player 
will be reminded of the value of the TRULY SENSITIVE assets.  
In CyberCIEGE, sites are offices and buildings where the users work. 
Each site is divided into one or more zones. A zone is a work area in the scenario that is 
controlled by a set of physical security policies. These policies are enforced by physical 
security measures. Players have to determine the level of physical security to be installed 
at each zone to control the access and monitor movement into these zones. These 
physical security measures protect the components and assets that are placed within the 
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zone. In this scenario, to achieve the goal for protecting a TRULY SENSITIVE asset, 
players have to purchase and implement security components that collectively are strong 
enough to counter the adversaries’ motive to attack. In doing so, the player learns about 
the strength of each security measure and that higher classified assets will require greater 
physical protection. 
b. Separate Networks  
Chapter II, Section D describes why organizations tend to maintain 
separate networks to manage information of different sensitivities, for example TRULY 
SENSITIVE and SENSITIVE. And it explains why connections between these separate 
networks are avoided unless there is a strong operational need. 
This scenario will require the player to provide users with computer and 
network resources to work on both TRULY SENSITIVE and UNCLASSIFIED assets. 
This is achieved using CyberCIEGE user goals. In the first two phases of the scenario, 
users will have individual goals that can be achieved by separately accessing the TRULY 
SENSITIVE and UNCLASSIFIED assets. No one goal will require access to both. 
The scenario uses CyberCIEGE conditions and triggers to guide the 
players to set up the necessary computer and network equipment for the separate accesses 
to TRULY SENSITIVE and UNCLASSIFIED assets. CyberCIEGE conditions are 
configured in the scenario to test if the players have provided simultaneous access to both 
assets via interconnecting the networks of different classifications. If such a condition 
exists, the scenario will trigger message events to warn the player of a security violation. 
Players have to remedy the network configuration. Upon failure to do so, the game 
engine will generate attacks to capture and disclose the TRULY SENSITIVE asset which 
can be accessed via the UNCLASSIFIED network. Through achieving the goals in the 
game, the player will learn the importance of separating networks of different 
classifications. 
c. Controlled Sharing of Classified Information 
Phases 1 and 2 have separated goals for accessing individual assets; there 
is no requirement for simultaneous access to multiple assets at different classifications. In 
Phases 3 and 4, players have to fulfill goals that require simultaneous access to multiple  
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assets of different classifications. They will have to configure interconnections between 
systems and networks of different classifications while protecting the confidentiality of 
classified information.  
Phase 3 of the scenario challenges the players with a CyberCIEGE goal to 
provide a TRULY SENSITIVE user with the access to both the TRULY SENSITIVE 
intelligence asset and SENSITIVE Allied Force asset simultaneously. The TRULY 
SENSITIVE asset is stored in the server room at the C2 center, while the SENSITIVE 
asset is stored at an offsite office which can only be accessed via a network connection. 
The network connection between the offsite office and C2 center is protected via link 
encryptors.  The physical security of the offsite zone will be selected such that it is 
sufficient to protect SENSITIVE information, but not TRULY SENSITIVE information. 
Thus to fulfill the user’s goal of simultaneous access, players have to set up high 
assurance, MLS components to secure the interconnection. The CyberCIEGE scenario 
offers a variety of workstations, a mixture of both low and high assurance systems. 
Players will be tempted to purchase the low assurance workstations as they are cheaper 
and the players have a limited budget. Low assurance systems provide less confidence in 
the correctness and completeness of security implementations and hence when deployed, 
these systems will be more vulnerable to attacks. Players will have to select high 
assurance systems for this deployment. For the configuration of an MLS component, 
proper labeling of connections to the MLS workstation and training for the user’s 
interaction with the MLS workstation will be required, as these MLS components have 
more sophisticated procedures to enforce security policies and protect the classified 
assets. If the players provide insecure connections between the networks, the game 
engine will compromise the TRULY SENSITIVE assets by defeating the offsite physical 
security to gain access to the SENSITIVE network through which TRULY SENSITIVE 
information can be accessed. 
In Phase 4 of the scenario, players will need to scale the interconnections 
to provide simultaneous access to the UNCLASSIFIED asset on the Internet. That is, 
players will have to provide access to TRULY SENSITIVE, SENSITIVE and 
UNCLASSIFIED assets simultaneously. Unlike phase 3 where the remote asset is 
classified SENSITIVE and stored in a secure offsite office, assets on the Internet are open 
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source resources and the network is accessible by everyone, including the adversaries. 
Hence, assets on the Internet have lower or little security protection and the Internet 
network is more prone to attacks. Therefore, the risk involved in connecting to the 
Internet is much higher than connecting to an Allied Force asset at the secure remote 
office.  
The scenario is designed to use conditions and triggers to stimulate cyber 
attacks on the IT infrastructure. This is done to control when to introduce attacks to the 
systems so as to allow players to better understand the impact of their decisions. 
However, such attacks are of fixed frequency, and both the connections to the 
SENSITIVE network and to the UNCLASSIFIED Internet are subjected to the same rate 
of attacks. This is unlike real world implementations where the assets on the Internet are 
more frequently attacked than assets protected in a secure office. 
On the other hand, CyberCIEGE is able to overcome this shortcoming 
with different attack values. CyberCIEGE attack triggers have randomly generated attack 
values which determine the strength of these attacks. These attack values are compared to 
the physical security of the assets and network to determine if these assets and network 
are successfully attacked and compromised. Since the Internet resources have little 
physical security protection, the values of their physical security will be lower than those 
of the secure offsite office. Thus there will be more attacks that successfully compromise 
the resources on the Internet as compared to the attacks on the secure offsite office. When 
the players connect the TRULY SENSITIVE network to the Internet and to the 
SENSITIVE Allied Force network, the TRULY SENSITIVE network will experience 
more attacks from the Internet connection. Thus, it is important that proper labeling is 
done on the network connections to the MLS systems to ensure that appropriate security 
enforcements are applied to the connections of different classifications.  
Phase four of the scenario demonstrates the relative risks involved in 
connecting classified networks to the Internet as compared to connecting it to secure 
remote networks. The players will understand these risks as they configure the 
connections between resources of different classifications. 
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To complete the scenario, players will have to meet all of the objectives in each 
phase of the game. Each of these objectives will test the players’ understanding of the 
above concepts. Players will be exposed to the security issues mentioned above; they will 
have to make decisions regarding what computer and network equipment to buy and how 
to implement them in order to comply with and enforce the security policy. To complete 
and win this scenario, players will have to work within the allocated budget, and the 
implemented computer and network infrastructure will have to withstand attacks for over 
two days.  
 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the intended players and educational goals for this 
scenario. The next chapter will provide more details regarding the actual implementation 




IV  SCENARIO OUTLINE 
The Command and Control (C2) center scenario is developed to answer the thesis 
research question highlighted in Chapter III. This chapter describes the details of this 
scenario. The scenario is intended to achieve the educational goals highlighted in Chapter 
III, and it follows the described strategy. 
 
A. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
The scenario simulates a C2 center for military operations. The center is the 
fusion point of operational and tactical information and intelligence that will provide 
operational commanders with the necessary situational awareness for their deployments. 
Such information is essential to any mission as it provides the troop commanders with 
field information that is critical to the success of their missions. The command center acts 
as a depot for data, information and knowledge to aid in all military decisions.  
 
1. Layout of the Scenario 
The scenario consists of two locations: the C2 center and the remote offsite office. 
The layout of the C2 center is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Layout of C2 center 
 
A number of departments make up this C2 center. The intelligence department, 
which resides on the bottom left room of the C2 center, gathers information about the 
enemy, terrain and area of operations. The top left office is occupied by representatives 
from the Allied Forces. They serve as the liaison officers between their countries and the 
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commanders in the C2 center.  The server room is in the top middle of the C2 center and 
it houses all the server and network equipment. The main C2 operations are carried out in 
the command room on the right of the C2 center.  Military activities like force 
deployment, readiness assessment and mission planning are conducted in the command 
room.  
The offsite office is the secure office for the Allied Forces Headquarters and it 
consists of a single room.  
 
2. Narrative of the Scenario 
The following is the initial brief to the scenario. It provides a description of the 
context of the scenario, and the goals and requirements for the player. 
Welcome to the Command & Control Center. This is the nerve center of 
all military operations; it is here that all military planning, force 
deployment, readiness assessment and mission planning are conducted and 
decisions on these military activities are made. You have an important role 
in making this center work. As the head of Information Technology and 
Security, you have to provide the necessary infrastructure so that the 
command and staff officers can operate and develop the situation pictures 
of the various theatres of operations. These situation pictures will provide 
the situational awareness needed for military planning and they will serve 
as important sources of information for decision making. 
Your scope of work will involve setting up and maintaining the center’s 
computer and networking infrastructure, so as to keep the staff productive. 
While doing so, you have to ensure that the classified assets in the C2 
center are protected. This classified information includes military TRULY 
SENSITIVE intelligence information and SENSITIVE information 
contributed by the Allied Forces. You are given an initial budget to buy 
components, software, IT staff, etc. You will receive additional bonuses 
when you achieve certain significant milestones. You will have to identify 
the goals of the users, make choices about the types of components to 
purchase, and how to set up these components. If your choices 
compromise the security of the assets in the C2 center, you will be 
penalized monetarily. However, if your choices meet operational 
requirements and at the same time protect the classified assets, you will 
proceed to the next phase of the game. You win the game if you 
successfully complete all the objectives within the budget allocated. 
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Click the "CLEARANCE" button for information about the values of the 
classified assets. The scenario is divided into several phases. You must 
complete all objectives of a phase to move to the next phase. Use the 
OBJECTIVES button in the OFFICE tab to see your objectives for each 
phase. Press "e" at any time to view the CyberCIEGE encyclopedia, which 
includes a "How To" section. Press "k" to view keyboard shortcuts and 
navigation keys. Click the "OFFICE" tab and click the green key "play" 
button  to begin play. Good luck! 
 
B. ELEMENTS OF THE SCENARIO 
This section describes the elements that constitute the C2 scenario.  
 
1. Users  
Users are the simulated characters within the scenario. They interact within the 
virtual environment and are affected by the decisions made by the player. In the C2 
center scenario, there are two groups of users: staff officers who operate in the C2 center 
and the support staff that provides peripheral support to the operations of the C2 center.  
The staff officers are Maj. Keith, Capt. George, Lt. Deborah, Lt. Robbie and Lt. 
Cristiano. And the members of the support staff are Matthew and Tommy. All the 
personnel in the C2 centers are security cleared to TRULY SENSITIVE. 
Maj. Keith is the commanding officer in charge of the C2 center. He keeps 
abreast of the latest developments in various theaters of operations by constantly studying 
the changes in the situations that occur in the places of interest. He reads the reports and 
classified analyses submitted by his staff officer, Capt. George, and accesses the Internet 
for current affairs information. If there are sudden changes of events or occurrences of 
unexpected activities which have a drastic impact on military operations, Maj. Keith will 
convene higher-level meetings and update the commanders from the various military 
services. 
Capt. George supports Maj. Keith in his duties. He processes, analyzes and 
assimilates military related information from various sources in order to produce timely 
and accurate situation reports and updates for Maj. Keith.  Capt. George accesses military 
information mainly from two sources: the TRULY SENSITIVE intelligence information 
gathered from the intelligence department and SENSITIVE military operations and 
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reports from Allied Forces. Capt. George occasionally accesses the Internet to download 
articles, as instructed by Maj. Keith, in preparation for high-level meetings. Therefore, 
Capt George has the goal to simultaneously access the Intelligence, Allied Forces 
information and sources from the Internet, as described below 
Lt. Deborah is from the Military Intelligence branch and she works in the 
Intelligence office, gathering military intelligence and storing it in the departmental 
server. As this information is highly sensitive and valuable to military mission planning, 
Intelligence information is classified TRULY SENSITIVE and has to be kept in the 
strictest confidentiality.  Lt. Deborah needs to access the Intelligence asset in order to 
complete her job. In addition, Lt Deborah also accesses the Internet to monitor activities 
and reports gathered from the Intelligence. Therefore she has two separate goals: access 
to Intelligence information and access to the Internet. 
Lt. Robbie and Lt. Cristiano are from the Allied Forces. They are attached to the 
C2 centers as liaison officers from their respective countries. They keep in contact with 
the military headquarters in their respective countries and exchange military information 
relevant to the C2 center’s operations. Such information is important, as it provides 
military status of the respective countries and intelligence gathered, which is critical to 
coalition missions. Information from the Allied Forces is stored in a separate server at the 
remote Allied Forces Headquarters and is classified SENSITIVE.  
Matthew is the IT support staff employed to provide computer and network 
support in the C2 center. As the C2 center deploys a variety of IT equipment, from 
workstations to servers and network equipment, Matthew will be in charge of providing 
the first level of support and troubleshooting to resolve any operational hiccups. Matthew 
has a diploma in computer science and he is capable of maintaining the equipment and 
ensuring that it is configured according to the organizational IT security policy.  He has a 
skill value of 90 out of 100 for software and hardware skills, and a value of 95 for his 
initial training. 
Tommy is a trained security guard employed to beef up the security of the C2 
center. He is armed and can be deployed to perform access control at the building 
entrance by ensuring that all personnel display proper passes or identification before 
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entering the C2 center. Tommy has a skill set of 90 and an initial training value of 90. He 
is capable and will patrol the perimeter of the center if required.   
 
2. Mandatory Policy 
The following classifications are used in the C2 center scenario. All assets and 
security clearances have been assigned with one of these classifications. The game engine 
will enforce Mandatory Access Control policy to enforce the protection of assets 
according to these classifications. For example, users with a SENSITIVE security 
clearance will not be able to access assets classified as TRULY SENSITIVE.   
TRULY SENSITIVE: The highest classification in the scenario. It is used on 
assets that, if they are compromised, will have devastating impact on all military 
operations. Mission plans based on such information will be potentially foiled. The 
TRULY SENSITIVE classification has a secrecy value of 100,000 points and an attacker 
motive value of 800. Users need to have high background checks in order to access 
TRULY SENSITIVE assets. 
SENSITIVE: This classification is used on assets that, if they are compromised, 
will have grave impact on all military activities. While the impact is serious, it would not 
determine the success or failure of any military mission. This classification has a secrecy 
value of 60,000 points and an attacker motive value of 400. Users are required to have 
medium background checks to access SENSITIVE assets. 
UNCLASSIFIED: This is the lowest classification in the C2 scenario. Assets with 
this classification have little or no value to the organization. Thus their disclosure will not 
cause any damage to the military operations in the C2 center. This classification has no 




Assets are the critical resources of the game. They are what the users need to  
have access to in order to be productive and happy with their work. The assets that 
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players need to provide users access to, while ensuring their protection, are: the 
Intelligence information, Allied Forces information and information from the Internet.  
Intelligence is one of the most important assets of any military organization, as it 
provides insight about the adversaries, their locations, activities and both military and 
political operations. Such insight is important for military planning and it can be decisive 
in a successful mission. Therefore, the Intelligence asset is very valuable to the C2 center 
and it will cost the department $1,000,000 if this asset is compromised. The Intelligence 
information is classified TRULY SENSITIVE and it has a very high motive value of 800 
to attract potential attackers. The Intelligence asset is stored in the Intelligence server 
residing in the server room of the C2 center.  
Allied Forces information regarding their military plans, troop deployment and 
intelligence, is relevant to the combined missions. Such information is important for joint 
planning and it provides an additional reliable source of intelligence for military 
planning. This information is classified SENSITIVE and it has a motive value of 400. 
The Allied Forces information is housed in the server at the secure remote Allied Forces 
Headquarters office, which has the physical security of 500. 
Web pages on the Internet are rich sources of information and they provide media 
coverage of events happening around the world. Such information is important to keep 
abreast of the development in the theatres of operation and they contribute to the 
development of the operational situation pictures. As the information from the Internet is 
from an open source, it is UNCLASSIFIED and has no attack motive and no secrecy 
value.  
 
4. Physical Components 
The player begins this scenario with the Intelligence server residing in the server 
room of the C2 center and Allied Force server located in the secure offsite office. Two 
workstations are set up in the Allied Forces department to allow Lt. Robbie and Lt. 
Cristiano remote access to the Allied Forces assets.  
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Both the Intelligence and Allied Force servers and the workstations in the 
Intelligence department and Allied Force department in the C2 center are static 
components; the player cannot make changes to these components.  
 
5. Networks 
Some default networks are set up to connect the physical components in the 
scenario. For remote access to the Intelligence asset, an Internal Intel Local Area 
Network (LAN) is set up within the C2 center to connect the workstations in the 
Intelligence Department to the Intelligence server. A leased line is laid from the offsite 
Allied Forces Headquarters to the C2 center. This leased line is protected by link 
encryptors at both ends of communication and is indirectly connected to the Allied 
Forces server at the offsite office. At the C2 center, workstations in the Allied Forces 
department have remote access to the Allied Forces assets by riding on an Internal Allied 
Forces LAN which, in turn, is connected to the leased line.  
Additional networks, LAN 1 and LAN 2, are available for the player to establish 




Goals are associated with users, and are used to specify assets they need to access. 
They determine whether the users are able to accomplish their tasks and be productive to 
the organization. If the users’ goals are not met, users’ productivity will drop and their 
happiness will decline. This will, in return, affect the organization’s bottom line. 
Therefore, a player of the scenario has to provide the necessary components in order for 
the users to gain access to the required assets and fulfill their goals. 
The following are the descriptions of the asset goals in the C2 center scenario: 
Access Intelligence. This goal requires read access to the Intelligence asset. The 
Intelligence asset is compiled and assimilated by the Intelligence department and is stored 
in the Intelligence server at the server room of the C2 center. Since there is no local 
access to the Intelligence server, this goal requires the player to set up a workstation with 
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network connections to the Intelligence Server for remote access. The player also has to 
beef up the physical security of the C2 center to protect this asset. 
Access Web Resource. This goal requires read access to the resources on the 
Internet.  As the Internet is on the wide area network (WAN), the player will have to 
purchase a routing device that can connect the local area networks within the C2 center to 
the WAN. 
Simultaneous Access to Intelligence and Allied Forces Information. This goal 
requires concurrent access to these two assets of different classifications. In order to plan 
for combined military operations, Capt. George needs to assimilate the intelligence from 
the Allied Forces with that from his own force, so that joint planning and operations are 
done as overlapping and simultaneous activities. The player will have to provide a high 
assurance computer component with MLS capability to provide the necessary protection 
for the classified information. 
Simultaneous Access to Intelligence, Allied Forces Information and Sources from 
the Internet. As the commanding officer of the C2 center, Maj. Keith keeps abreast of the 
latest developments in the various theaters of operation. He reads reports and classified 
analyses submitted by Capt. George, and accesses the Internet for current affairs 
information. This goal requires that the player help Maj. Keith set up concurrent access to 
the open source information from the Internet, SENSITIVE Allied Forces assets on the 
remote server and TRULY SENSITIVE Intelligence information from the server room in 
the C2 center. 
 
7.  Zones in the C2 center 
The entire scenario is divided into two zones, the C2 center zone and the Offsite 
Office zone. The C2 center zone comprises the entire physical Command and Control 
center, including the server room, command room, the Intelligence department and the 
Allied Forces department. This zone is built with re-enforced walls and has key locks as 
the default physical security. Only the staff officers and support staff of the C2 center are 
allowed into the C2 center zone and they have to display their identification. These 
security measures constitute a physical protection value of 316 points. The player is 
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expected to increase the physical security of the C2 center zone to protect the classified 
assets kept within these premises. 
The Offsite Office Zone is the secure remote office housing the Allied Forces 
Headquarters. It has a physical security value of 500 to protect the SENSITIVE Allied 
Forces asset stored in the building. The player is not allowed to make changes to the 
components in the offsite office. 
 
8.  Conditions and Triggers 
CyberCIEGE conditions are set in the scenario to check for the occurrences of 
certain events or situations. When these conditions occur, the CyberCIEGE game engine 
will execute the corresponding triggers associated with these conditions.  
In the C2 scenario, the following conditions and triggers are defined.  
C2 center Has 800. This condition checks if the C2 center has physical protection 
of at least 800 points. It checks if the player has completed the requirement for beefing up 
the physical security of the C2 center. If this condition is satisfied, compounded with the 
set up of access to Intelligence Information, the CyberCIEGE game engine will proceed 
to Phase 2 of the scenario. 
Everyone’s Assets Goals : This condition checks if all user’s existing assets goals 
are satisfied. If they are, this condition will trigger the transition to the next phase of the 
scenario. 
Min Cash 0. Player has a budget to purchase components for meeting assets goals.    
If he depletes the budget due to overspending or because of monetary penalties, he loses 
the game. This condition checks for budget depletion equal to or below zero and triggers 
the “No Cash -Lose” event for game termination.  
Lt. Deborah has no Intelligence access. This condition checks if user Lt. Deborah 
has access to the Intelligence assets. This is the asset goal and part of the objective in 
Phase 1 of the scenario. 
Capt. George has Internet access. This condition checks if user Capt. George has 
access to assets on the Internet. This is the goal and objective for Phase 2 of the scenario. 
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Capt. George has Allied Forces and Intelligence assets.  This condition checks if 
user Capt. George has simultaneous access to the Allied Forces assets and Intelligence 
assets. This is one of the goals for Phase 3 of the scenario.  If this condition is met, the 
scenario will proceed to the next phase. 
Capt. George’s Training is less than 60 points. This condition checks if Capt. 
George has sufficient user interface training to use the MLS system. If this condition and  
Capt. George’s Allied Forces and Intelligence assets conditions are met, the scenario will 
proceed to Phase 4.  
Capt. George has Internet Allied Forces And Intelligence assets. This condition 
checks if Capt. George has concurrent access to the assets from the Internet, Allied Force 
and the Intelligence departments. It is the goal of Phase 4 of the scenario. If this condition 
is satisfied, the player enters the final phase, consisting of a simple quiz. 
Intelligence Server Attack. This condition checks what happens if the Intelligence 
assets are attacked by outsiders via the Internet connection. If it has not been attacked, 
this condition will trigger the CyberCIEGE game engine to simulate such attacks with 
motive values from 400 to 900 points. 
Allied Forces Server Attack. This condition checks what happens if the Allied 
Forces assets are attacked by outsiders via the Internet connection. If it has not been 
attacked, this condition will trigger the CyberCIEGE game engine to simulate such 
attacks with motive values from 200 to 500 points. 
Intelligence Information to Web Internet.  This is a network filtering condition 
which checks if there is a network connection between the TRULY SENSITIVE 
Intelligence assets and UNCLASSIFIED web resources on the Internet. If there is, this 
constitutes a security violation and the CyberCIEGE game engine will simulate 
Intelligence Server Attacks as described above. 
Allied Forces Information to Web Internet.  This is a network filtering condition 
which checks if there is a network connection between the SENSITIVE Allied Force  
assets and UNCLASSIFIED web resources on the Internet. If there is, this constitutes a 
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security violation and the CyberCIEGE game engine will simulate Allied Forces Server 
Attacks as described above. 
All goals met.  When all the goals in the scenario are met, this is the winning 
condition. This condition will trigger the Win state, which completes the game.  
 
9.  Phases  
This scenario is divided into four phases. Each phase challenges the players in a 
specific area of Information Assurance. The scenario will depict some goals which the 
players have to fulfill. To satisfy these goals, the player will have to demonstrate 
knowledge of the specific IA issues being tested.  
Phase 1 introduces the concept of physical security. The player has to set up 
remote access to the TRULY SENSITIVE intelligence information. In doing so, he has to 
provide adequate physical security measures in the C2 center to protect this classified 
asset.   
Phase 2 introduces the need for Internet access. The key to completing this phase 
is to ensure that the connection to the Internet is separated from the access to classified 
information.  
Phase 3 challenges the players with the need to provide simultaneous access to 
classified information of different secrecy levels. Players are required to establish 
components to provide the user with access to the TRULY SENSITIVE intelligence 
information and SENSITIVE information from the Allied Forces, which is located in a 
secure remote office.  
Phase 4, the final phase, scales the requirement for simultaneous access to include 
the access to unclassified assets on the Internet. As the Internet is an open network, 
players need to understand the greater risk of connecting to the Internet and that only 





10.  Catalog of Components 
Based on the goals of the users and the objectives at each phase of the scenario, 
the player has to purchase new components to set up network connections to the assets. 
The scenario provides a list of components which the player can purchase. Some of the 
components relevant to this scenario are:  
• Entry-Level Desktop Computers. These are low-cost general purpose 
desktops that can be deployed to access and process assets. They come 
with a full suite of office-processing software like Word Triangle for word 
processing, Spread Triangle for spread sheet applications and the URL2U 
web browser, etc. However, such computers are not certified to provide 
any assurance of the correctness of their implementations and they do not 
have in-built security mechanisms to control access to different classes of 
information.  Examples of these computers are Blatto Desktop Select, 
Targo Worksaver and Lunitos AFOS systems. 
• Workstations with Trusted Operating Systems. Trusted operating systems 
provide security mechanisms and services that protect and separate 
classified information. They are used for management of information with 
different classifications. In this scenario, two types of such workstations 
are available: Trusted Targo Worksaver and Green Net Client system. 
• High Assurance Systems with Trusted Operating Systems. These are 
highly trustworthy systems with multilevel security capabilities. The only 
high assurance MLS system available for purchase is the Greenshade 
Client workstation. 
• Servers are generally used to store assets for sharing or to host application 
programs. A variety of different types of servers are available; they range 
from full featured servers (e.g., Targo Server, Blato Server, Twist Off 
Server) to high assurance, secure servers (e.g., Green Shade Server). 
Specialized application servers, like email (Mail Appliance, Populos 
Letter Pusher) and web servers (Web Appliance, Populos Internet Slave) 
are also available for deployment.  
• Networking routers and hubs. Routers and hubs are internetworking 
devices that interconnect multiple networks.  Hubs are simple bridging 
devices that connect multiple computers or multiple networks of similar 
protocols. Both Wire Stuff and “Box with Wires” are reliable hubs offered 
by the CyberCIEGE game engine. Routers, on the other hand, are more 
advanced bridging gateway devices as they are able to interpret different 
network protocols. Therefore, routers are used to connect networks of 
different protocols, for example, connections between LANs and Wide 
Area Networks (WANs). Bit Flipper is the only high performance router 
offered.  
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Players make decisions on the choice of components to purchase and set up in the 
scenario that will assist the users to achieve their goals.  
 
C.  SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a description of the C2 Scenario and its key elements. The 
player has to understand the needs of the users and provide the necessary components for 
them to achieve their goals. Each phase of the scenario will consist of one or two goals 
and when they are met, the scenario will proceed to the next phase. The player wins the 
game when he has completed all phases of the scenario. 
The next chapter will discuss the proposed solution to the scenario and the testing 
done to verify that the game engine responds in an expected manner, given certain 
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V. SCENARIO TESTING 
This chapter describes the testing procedures conducted for this thesis. It begins 
by discussing the testing objective and testing methodology used for the verification of 
this scenario. Following that, detailed descriptions of the test cases, expected results, and 
actual test results are presented 
 
A. PURPOSE OF TESTING 
The scenario developed for this thesis teaches the players the educational goals, as 
described in Chapter II. The scenario provides feedback to the players to guide them 
through the scenario. Players make decisions while going through the scenario. If the 
decisions are correct, the scenario will respond with positive feedback to encourage the 
players to proceed. If the players make some incorrect decisions, the scenario will 
provide immediate negative feedback so that the players are aware of their mistakes. 
Players learn by observing the feedback generated by the scenario.  
The purpose of this testing is to demonstrate that the feedback in the scenario is 
consistent with the real-world expectations. Test Cases were defined to verify the 
scenario. Each test case describes a situation in the scenario that teaches the player one of 
the designated educational goals. The expected results based on real-world expectations 
were also defined. The scenario was then executed according to the test cases and its 
behavior was observed. If the observed results matched the expected results, the scenario 
was verified to be correct. If they did not match, the scenario was not behaving according 
to the real-world expectations and thus needs to be corrected.  
In each test case, two types of tests are considered. First, the scenario is tested 
with the anticipated correct solution of the game. This is to verify that the game executes 
according to the design of the scenario.  The solution to the game describes the steps 
necessary to achieve the goal of the scenario. In other words, if the players make choices 
as stated in the solution, the game should provide positive feedback and progress through 
the phases, leading the player to completing the game. Second, the scenario was tested 
against expected alternatives or failure conditions. When the players makes bad security 
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choices and hence configures the components differently, the game should respond with 
negative feedback. Note that there might be more than one solution to the game but the 
solution tested is based on the design intended to educate players on specific IA concepts. 
 
B. TEST CASES 
Three sets of test cases were defined, each corresponding to one educational goal, 
as described in Chapter II. The test cases are organized into three subsections. The first 
subsection defines the scope of the test, which is the educational goal it aims to 
demonstrate. It includes the test procedures to achieve these goals. The second subsection 
defines the expected results. It includes the expected results that should occur when the 
player applied the test procedures accordingly and the expected results if the player 
deviates from the solution. The final subsection records the actual results captured from 
the execution of the game. Each of the tests was executed using the same version of the 
game engine. This was done to prevent any anomalies that may result from different 
versions of the game engine. The actual results produced by each of the tests are observed 
and double-checked with the log files produced by the game engine to ensure that the 
observation corresponds with the behavior of the game engine. The actual results were 
compared to the expected results to verify that the game responds as expected. 
 
1. Test Case 1: Physical Security  
a. Scope of Test Case 
Test Case 1 focuses on the need for physical security which is the first 
educational goal as stated in Chapter II. In the scenario, user Lt. Deborah has the Access 
Intelligence goal, as described in Chapter III. Therefore, the player has to set up a 
computer terminal in the Intelligence office with a network connection to the Intelligence 
server, thus extending the access of these assets beyond the server room. As the TRULY 
SENSITIVE Intelligence assets have an attack motive value of 800, the player will have 
to increase the physical security of the C2 center which has a default physical protection 
value of 316. Therefore, the player is expected to:  
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i)  Purchase a computer workstation, place it at the Intelligence 
Department office and connect it to Internal Intel LAN. 
ii)  On the zone tab, select the C2 center and purchase the following 
physical security settings for the C2 center Zone. 
o Guard at door 
o Prohibit media 
o Prohibit phone services 
o Good Zone Alarm 
o Surveillance cameras 
o Badges required 
o Cyber lock 
 
b. Expected Results 
If the player follows the steps to the solution as highlighted in the above 
paragraph, the scenario will complete Phase 1 of the game and proceed to Phase 2.  
If the player does nothing to improve the physical security, or does not 
have enough security measures, the CyberCIEGE game engine will generate outsider 
break-in attacks to compromise the assets.  
If the player does not provide a workstation or network connection to 
fulfill Lt Deborah’s Access Intelligence goal, Lt Deborah’s productivity will drop and 
this will reduce the efficiency of the C2 center, and the player will incur monetary 
penalties. 








Test ID Description Expected Results 
Test Case 1a The player provides a workstation for 
remote access to Intelligence 
information. The player also increases 
physical security of the C2 center 
beyond 800 points  
 
Lt. Deborah will achieve 
her objective to access the 
intelligence information. 
Test Case 1b The player provides a workstation for 
remote access to Intelligence 
information. The player also increases 
physical security but keeps it below 800 
points. 
Lt. Deborah will have 
access to the intelligence 
information, but the assets 
will be stolen by external 
attacks 
Test Case 1c The player provides a workstation for 
remote access to Intelligence 
information. But the player does nothing 
to improve the physical security. 
Lt Deborah will have access 
to the intelligence 
information, but the assets 
will be stolen by external 
attacks. 
Test Case 1d The player does not provide a remote 
workstation or the connection of the 
workstation to the Intelligence server 
Lt Deborah will complain 
and the available budget for 
the scenario will be 
reduced. 
Table 1. Test Case 1 Expected Results 
 
c. Actual Results 
The following table (Table 2) captures the actual results and identifies 
where the game meets the expected results. 
Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected 
Results 
Test Case 1a Lt. Deborah achieved her goal  Yes 
Test Case 1b Lt Deborah had access to Intelligence 
information, but this information was later 
stolen. As a result, the player incurred 
monetary penalties 
Yes 
Test Case 1c Lt Deborah had access to Intelligence 
information, but this information was later 
stolen. As a result, the player incurred 
monetary penalties 
Yes 
Test Case 1d Intelligence information was stolen and the 
player incurred monetary penalties 
Yes 
Table 2. Test Case 1 Actual Results 
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As shown in Table 2, the actual test results meet the expected results. 
When the assets are extended to a control room of lower security, and left unprotected, 
they will quickly be compromised, either by unauthorized disclosure or because the 
workstation containing the assets will be stolen. Increasing the physical security will 
increase the protection of the assets, however sufficient security measures must be 
installed to thwart physical attacks on the assets. 
 
2. Test Case 2: Separate Networks 
a. Scope of Test Case 
Test Case 2 focuses on the need for separate networks. It emphasizes the 
need to provide different levels of security protection for information of different 
classifications, and the need to manage them separately. This test case stretches across 
the first two phases of the scenario. In Phase 1, user Lt. Deborah has a goal to access the 
TRULY SENSITIVE Intelligence assets which has an attack motive of 800. In Phase 2, 
Lt. Deborah has another goal to access UNCLASSIFIED web pages on the Internet, 
which have a zero attack motive.  
The solution to this test case is to set up two separate computer systems; 
one attaches to the TRULY SENSITIVE Intelligence network and the other attaches to 
the Internet. This will allow Lt. Deborah to have access to both assets. There should not 
be any interconnection between the two networks or connection between these two 
computer systems. Therefore, the player is expected to:   
i)  Purchase a computer workstation, place it at the Intelligence room 
and connect it to Internal Intel LAN. 
ii)  Purchase a second computer workstation and place it at the 
Intelligence room. 
iii)  Purchase a router and place it in the server room. Establish an 
Internet connection using this router. 






b. Expected Results 
Step i) is part of Test Case 1, thus it would have been tested. When the 
player proceeds with steps ii) – iv), he will have completed Phase 2 of the scenario. The 
game will proceed with Phase 3 of the scenario. 
However, if the player uses the computer terminal set up in Phase 1 and 
connects it to the Internet, or he selects an entry level desktop computer, or low assurance 
workstations with a trusted operating system, and connects it to both networks, he would 
have set up an insecure link between the TRULY SENSITIVE and UNCLASSIFIED 
networks.  This workstation would not have the necessary security mechanisms to 
separate and enforce the access policies for this information based on their classifications. 
As a result, the game engine will compromise the TRULY SENSITIVE assets by 
defeating this low assurance workstation through the Internet connection, and thus gain 
access to the TRULY SENSITIVE network. 
Table 3 summarizes the tests in Test Case 2. 
Test ID Description Expected Results 
Test Case 2a The player provides two computer 
terminals for Lt. Deborah to access the 
Intelligence assets and the Internet 
separately.  There is no interconnection 
between these two terminals. 
 
Lt. Deborah will achieve 
her two goals to access the 
Intelligence information and 
the Internet in Phases 1 and 
2 respectively. The game 
will proceed with Phase 3. 
Test Case 2b The player uses the computer set up in 
Phase 1 and connects it to the Internet 
The TRULY SENSITIVE 
Intelligence assets will be 
attacked and stolen by 
outsider attacks coming in 
via the Internet. As a result, 
the player will lose all his 
money and lose the game. 
Test Case 2c The player provides a normal, low 
assurance workstation to connect to both 
the TRULY SENSITIVE Intelligence 
network and to the UNCLASSIFIED 
Internet.  
The TRULY SENSITIVE 
Intelligence assets will be 
attacked and stolen by 
outsider attacks, causing the 
player to lose all his money 
and thus the game. 
Table 3. Test Case 2 Expected Results 
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c.  Actual Results 
Table 4 captures the actual results and identifies where the game meets the 
expected results. 
  
Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected 
Results 
Test Case 2a Lt Deborah achieved her two goals and the 
scenario proceeded to Phase 3. 
Yes 
Test Case 2b Intelligence information was stolen by 
external attacks. The player incurred 
monetary penalties. 
Yes 
Test Case 2c Intelligence information was stolen by 
external attacks. The player incurred 
monetary penalties. 
Yes 
Table 4. Test Case 2 Actual Results 
 
Table 4 shows that the actual test results meet the expected results. The 
player has to provide separate computer components to provide separate access to assets 
of different classifications. 
 
3. Test Case 3: Controlled Sharing of Classified Information 
a. Scope of Test Case 
The goal of Test Case 3 is to illustrate to the player how to set up the 
proper mechanisms to provide simultaneous access to information of different 
classifications. This test spans Phases 3 and 4 of the scenario. User Capt. George wants to 
achieve the goal for Simultaneous Access to Intelligence and Allied Force Information in 
Phase 3 and to achieve the other goal for Simultaneous Access to Intelligence, Allied 
Force Information and web pages from the Internet in Phase 4. The descriptions of these 






Therefore the player is expected to: 
i) Purchase a high assurance MLS workstation and connect it to the three 
networks. 
ii) At the network interfaces to the MLS workstation, label each of the 
connections with the security classification of the network. 
iii) Provide additional training to Capt. George such that his skill will be 
increased above 60 points of training. 
  
b. Expected Results 
If the player completes the three steps according to the solution, he would 
have completed Phases 3 and 4 of the scenario. The scenario will proceed to Phase 5, 
which consists of a mini quiz. 
The player may decide to use an entry level desktop computer or a low 
assurance workstation to set up the connections to the TRULY SENSITIVE and 
SENSITIVE networks to meet the goal in Phase 3. However, such a configuration will 
provide an insecure link between the two networks, resulting in the compromise of the 
TRULY SENSITIVE assets as explained in Chapter II, Section B under the “Controlled 
Sharing of Classified Information.” 
The player may not provide Capt. George with the necessary training. In 
this case, Capt George’s productivity and efficiency will suffer, and thus the player will 
be monetarily penalized. If the player does not label the network interfaces to the MLS 
system with the correct classifications, there will be no sharing of classified information 
and Capt. George would not be able to achieve his goals. However, if the player labels 
the network interfaces to the MLS system with the incorrect classifications, information 
with higher classification can flow to less classified networks, and the highly classified 
information can potentially be leaked. This is definitely a security violation. 
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Table 5 summarizes the tests for Test Case 3. 
 
Test ID Description Expected Results 
Test Case 3a The player purchased a high assurance 
MLS workstation and connected it to the 
TRULY SENSITIVE Intelligence 
network, SENSITIVE Allied Forces 
network and to the UNCLASSIFIED 
Internet. He labeled all these network 
connections at the MLS interfaces and 
provided additional training to Capt. 
George to use the more complex 
procedures in the MLS system. 
Player completed Phases 3 
and 4 of the scenario. 
Test Case 3b In Phase 3, the player purchased a low 
assurance workstation and connected it 
to both the TRULY SENSITIVE 
Intelligence network and SENSITIVE 
Allied Forces networks. 
Capt. George would have 
simultaneous access to the 
Intelligence information and 
Allied Forces information. 
However, the TRULY 
SENSITIVE Intelligence 
assets would be 
compromised subsequently 
and the player would be 
heavily penalized in his 
budget and thus would lose 
the game. 
Test Case 3c In Phase 3, the player did not provide 
Capt George with the necessary training 
to increase his skill sets to operate the 
MLS workstation.  
Capt George will not 
achieve his goal in Phase 3 
and the player will be 
penalized monetarily. 
Test Case 3d In Phase 3, the player did not label the 
network interface to the MLS system 
Capt George will not 
achieve his goal in Phase 3 
and the player will be 
penalized monetarily. 
Test Case 3e In Phase 3, the player labeled both the 
TRULY SENSITIVE and SENSITIVE 
network interface to the high assurance 
MLS system as UNCLASSIFIED 
Outsider attacks will steal 
the TRULY SENSITIVE 
information by defeating 
the offsite physical security 
to gain access to the 
SENSITIVE network 
through which TRULY 
SENSITIVE information 
can be assessed. 
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Test ID Description Expected Results 
Test Case 3f In Phase 3, the player labeled the 
TRULY SENSITIVE network interface 
to MLS as SENSITIVE and the 
SENSITIVE network interface to MLS 
as TRULY SENSITIVE. 
The TRULY SENSITIVE  
information will be 
exchanged and stored on the 
Allied Forces server. 
Outsider break in attacks 
will steal the TRULY 
SENSITIVE information by 
defeating the offsite 
physical security to gain 
access to the SENSITIVE 
network and thus the 
TRULY SENSITIVE 
information. 
Table 5. Test Case 3 Expected Results 
 
c.  Actual Results 
Table 6 captures the actual results and identifies where the game meets the 
expected results. 
  
Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected Results 
Test Case 3a The player completed Phases 3 and 4 of 
the scenario. 
Yes 
Test Case 3b Intelligence information was stolen and 
the player lost the game. 
Yes 
Test Case 3c Capt. George did not achieve his goal in 
phase 3, and the player incurred monetary 
penalties. 
Yes 
Test Case 3d Capt. George did not achieve his goal in 
phase 3, and the player incurred monetary 
penalties. 
Yes 
Test Case 3e Intelligence information was stolen and 
the player lost the game. 
Yes 
Test Case 3f Intelligence information was stolen and 
the player lost the game. 
Yes 
Table 6. Test Case 3 Actual Results 
 
Table 6 shows that the actual test results meet the expected results. The 
player has to select a high assurance MLS system in order to securely share the classified 
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information. The network connections to the MLS system have to be properly labeled 
with the security classifications of the assets in the network. Additional training is 
required to teach the user about how to use the more complex MLS system. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The test cases developed for this thesis are designed to verify that the scenario 
achieves the designated educational goals. This testing also validated that the 
CyberCIEGE game engine provides feedback commensurate with real-world 





























VI.  CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis addresses the issues concerning the sharing of classified information 
and demonstrates the use of high assurance MLS systems to provide simultaneous access 
to information at different sensitivity levels. It answered the following research question:  
Can a scenario be developed to illustrate the principles underlying the use of Multilevel 
Secure systems and how can MLS systems be deployed to protect different classes of 
sensitive information in a military environment? This thesis clearly shows that it is 
possible and how it is accomplished. Each phase of the scenario teaches IA concepts 
related to the management of classified information. The scenario is developed with a 
military background and illustrates the need for the management of classified information 
in the C2 center. Players are introduced to high assurance MLS workstations and they 
learn to configure the MLS systems to provide controlled simultaneous access to 
information at different sensitivity levels.  
This thesis contributes a drop to the pool of IA training. It utilizes the capability 
of the CyberCIEGE game engine to illustrate the concepts of MLS systems and their uses 
in the management of classified information. Lessons learned from the development of 
this scenario can be used for future development of other scenarios. With the recent 
increased emphasis on information security and the need for IA training, the value of 
computer-based training will increase and gaming will become an integral part of the 
training tools. CyberCIEGE will continue to incorporate more pedagogically valuable 
scenarios and contribute to the security awareness training in the DOD. 
 
B. FUTURE WORK RELATED TO THIS THESIS 
There is some related work which can be explored for future development. This 
work is related to the management of classified information and can build upon the C2 




1.  One-way Guard Component 
A MLS guard component provides a secure interface across a security boundary 
between systems operating at different security classifications. The guard component 
controls information flow across the network interface in both directions or may be 
restrictive to allow only a one way transfer. Such exchanges of information across a 
security boundary may be done automatically or may require manual review and approval 
done on an attached terminal. In real-world implementations, MLS guards are used to 
provide real-time controlled exchanges of data across networks of different 
classifications. They replace the airgap separation method which does not support 
instantaneous exchange of information. If MLS guards are modeled as one of the 
CyberCIEGE components, new CyberCIEGE scenarios can be developed to illustrate the 
controlled flow of information across networks of different security classifications, 
especially in the case of information flow from a network with higher security 
classification to a network of lower security classification and not vice versa.  
2. Multiple Off-Office Sites 
In the scenario developed for this thesis, both the Allied Forces HQ and web 
resources from the Internet reside on the same remote site, which is not realistic in a real-
world implementation. This is a limitation in the existing version of the CyberCIEGE 
game engine which does not support multiple remote sites. An enhancement could be 
made to the CyberCIEGE game engine. And this would greatly enhance the realism of 
the scenario. 
3. Specific User Training 
In the current version of the CyberCIEGE game engine, a player buys additional 
training for the user to upgrade his IA skills and knowledge. This training is generic and 
covers all aspects of training; from the use of specific components, such as MLS 
components, to firewalls, and IA awareness training. When the player buys this 
additional training, the user’s training value is increased. There is no differentiation 
among these types of training and thus it is not intuitive to the players that training is 
needed for a specific operation or for the use of some components. In addition, if a 
particular user needs to be trained for two different components, such training cannot be 
simulated in the current version of CyberCIEGE. One possibility is to provide a catalog 
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of different types of training, where each training element is specific to some IA 
awareness lessons or skills in the use of certain components.  
4. Testing with Students  
The scenario developed for this thesis was tested using test cases to verify that it 
provides the necessary feedback to the player and in doing so, teaches the player about 
the educational goals. It would also be beneficial to have the intended educational 
audience involved in the testing by playing the CyberCIEGE scenario. These intended 
players can be NPS students taking the IA courses, who could then provide valuable 
comments on the usefulness of the feedback mechanisms employed by the scenario, and 
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